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NOTES
"TRANSFERS BY CHECK": THE 90-DAY RULE
OF PREFERENCE RECOVERY UNDER
SECTION 547(b) OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
In a bankruptcy proceeding, the appointed trustee of the debtor's
estate has the authority to recover any transfers of property made by the
debtor within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing.1 Thus, when a
debtor makes a cash payment to a creditor less than 90 days before filing
for bankruptcy, the trustee may clearly recover the transfer. It is not
always clear, however, whether the payment could be recovered if made
by check.2 For instance, what if the check is delivered outside of the 90-
day period but is honored by the debtor's bank within the 90 days? This
question has divided lower courts interpreting both the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 3
Due to the disagreement generated by this issue, creditors receiving
payment by check face uncertainty and possible litigation if the debtor
later files for bankruptcy. Such litigation could be avoided if only one
rule were followed.
Several circuit courts of appeals have addressed the recoverability of
check transfers under the four-month time period of the Bankruptcy Act
of 18984 (the Act) and have reached different conclusions. Only the
Ninth Circuit, however, has addressed the question under section 547(b)
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19785 (the Code), which changed the
time period for recovering preferences from four months to 90 days.
Thus, the question of when a transfer by check occurs for the purpose of
section 547(b) is unsettled in almost every circuit.
This note will analyze whether, under section 547(b), the date a
check is delivered or the date the bank honors a check should determine
1. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1982).
2. A significant number of transactions occur by check. In the United States, between 40 and
45 billion checks are processed annually. Telephone interview with Paul Connolly, Senior Vice Pres-
ident, Check Product Manager, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Oct. 6, 1987).
3. See infra notes 37-77 aud accompanying text.
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982) (amended by the Bankruptcy and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(b)(2), 98 Stat. 333, 378). See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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the transfer date of the funds represented by that check for the purposes
of preference recovery. First, the note considers the history and develop-
ment of preference law within bankruptcy and discusses the language
and legislative history of section 547 of the Code.6 Next, the note sets
forth the purposes of both the Code and commercial law, and with these
purposes in mind surveys the various rationales used by courts in resolv-
ing this issue.7 This note argues that-in light of policy considerations
and pragmatic concerns, as well as in order to conform to accepted com-
mercial practice-the date on which the check was honored should be
the date by which the 90-day rule is measured.
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF VOIDABLE PREFERENCES IN
BANKRUPTCY LAW
Under normal circumstances, common law allows a debtor to prefer
any creditor over other creditors when paying or securing a debt." Once
a debtor declares bankruptcy, however, the trustee may avoid and re-
cover for the bankruptcy estate any transfers made by the debtor in satis-
faction of a prior unsecured debt which preferred one creditor over other
creditors with similar claims. The preferred creditor "is deemed to have
unduly improved his position to the detriment of other creditors of the
debtor's estate." 9 Such transfers, or "preferences," contradict the goal of
equal distribution among all creditors-a primary policy of bankruptcy
law. 10
6. See infra notes 8-28 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 29-77 and accompanying text.
8. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 547.01, at 547-6 (L. King 15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter COL-
LIER]; Green, Preference Law Under the Bankruptcy Code, 62 MICH. Bus. J. 544, 544 (1983). See
generally Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L REV. 713,
714 (1985) (discussing the development of the voidable preference concept and its English
antecedents).
9. Young, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR. LJ. 221,
222 (1980); see also Green, supra note 8, at 544 (preference law discourages debtor from making bad
faith transfers to the detriment of certain creditors).
10. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISiON, H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 177-78 (1977), quoted in COLLIER, supra note 8, 547.01, at 547-11. The
House Committee stated:
The purpose of the preference section is two-fold. First, by permitting the trustee to avoid
prebankruptcy transfers that occur within a short period before bankruptcy, creditors are
discouraged from racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into
bankruptcy. The protection thus afforded the debtor often enables him to work his way
out of a difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of his creditors. Second,
and more important, the preference provisions facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of
equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor. Any creditor that received a greater
payment than others of his class is required to disgorge so that all may share equally. The
operation of the preference section to deter "the race of diligence" of creditors to dismem-
ber the debtor before bankruptcy furthers the second goal of the preference section-that
of equality of distribution.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78 (1977).
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Preference law is rooted in the concept of fraud. Because a debtor
could discharge his debts through bankruptcy, English courts presumed
that bankrupt debtors in general were fraudulent.11 Treating bankruptcy
as a type of fraud continued when preferences were incorporated into
American bankruptcy law. This presumption, however, was rebuttable
upon a showing of no intent to defraud.12 As bankruptcy law developed,
the requirement that unsatisfied creditors show an intent to defraud be-
came irrelevant,13 and now virtually any -preference is avoidable if made
within a specified time period.14
Section 60 of the Act allowed a trustee to void any preferential
transfers of a debtor that occurred within four months preceeding the
bankruptcy filing.1 5 A creditor who received a preference within the pre-
scribed time period was required to return the payment to the bank-
ruptcy estate where it "be[came] available for distribution to creditors
generally." 16 The "preferred" creditor then received only a pro rata
share of the resulting bankruptcy estate.17
The Code differs in language and substance from the earlier Act.
The Code was intended to promote clarity, effect coordination with the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and avoid nonessential litigation.1 8
The specific language of the Code section for the avoidance of preferen-
tial transfers, however, does not vary substantially from the language of
its predecessor section in the Act.19 Section 547 of the Code provides
that a trustee may avoid any transfer from a debtor to a creditor if the
transfer was made "on or within 90 days before the date of filing of the
[bankruptcy] petition" and if the creditor would receive more from the
11. DeSimone, Section 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Ordinary Course of Business
Exception Without the 45 Day Rule, 20 AKRON L. REv. 95, 101 (1986); McCoid, Bankruptcy, Pref-
erences and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REv. 249, 250 (1981). For a discussion
of the development of voidable preferences in bankruptcy law, see Countryman, supra note 8, at 714.
12. Countryman, supra note 8, at 714.
13. Id. at 722-23; see also DeSimone, supra note 11, at 102-08.
14. See Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests as Voidable Preferences, 3 CARDOZO L. REV.
357, 359-60 nn.8-9 (1982); Countryman, supra note 8, at 725; DeSimone, supra note 11, at 106.
15. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60(b), 30 Stat. 544, 562 (repealed 1978); see also Coun-
tryman, supra note 8, at 722.
16. Ross, The Impact of Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code upon Secured and Unsecured Cred-
itors, 69 MINN. L. REV. 39, 44-45 (1984).
17. Id. at 45.
18. Young, supra note 9, at 221 (citing REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 169 (1976)).
19. See Kaye, Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197, 197
(1980) ("With a few notable exceptions, the basic elements of a voidable preference remain substan-
tially the same .... "). For further discussion of the changes made in the bankruptcy preference law
in the 1978 Code, see Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547 of the
Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 289 (1980).
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transfer than he would via the bankruptcy proceedings. 20
II. THE LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 547
Section 547(b)(4) states that a transfer is avoidable if made "on or
within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition. '21 This lan-
guage gives no indication of when the 90-day preference period begins if
the transfer in question is made by check. Nor does the definition of
"transfer" in the Code aid in this determination. 22 The legislative history
of the Code does not address the determinative date of a transfer by
check for purposes of section 547(b). 23 Legislative comments have been
made concerning section 547(c), which provides for exceptions to the
voidability of preferential transfer. Some courts believe that these com-
ments provide insight into the transfer question.
In the Code, section 547(c) contains the first specific statutory ex-
ceptions in preference law.24 These exceptions were intended to en-
courage creditors to come to the aid of a businessman in financial
difficulty and to protect ordinary business transactions.25 Transfers
made in the ordinary course of business and contemporaneous exchanges
for new value are excluded from the reach of the voidability provision. 26
20. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Section 547(b) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of
an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was
made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the exteut provided by the provi-
sions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (Supp. III 1985).
22. "'[T]ransfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including reten-
tion of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption ...... I I
U.S.C.A. § 101(50) (West Supp. 1987).
23. For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1978 Code and a proposed step-by-step
research format, see Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275
(1980).
24. DeSimone, supra note 11, at 106.
25. Id. at 100. See Remes v. Acme Carton Corp. (In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co.), 43 Bankr.
871, 876 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 71 Bankr. 287 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Tidwell v. Atlanta
Gas Light Co. (In re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 38 Bankr. 829, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984).
26. Section 547(c) provides:
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When the Code was drafted in 1978, such transfers had to be made
within 45 days after the debt was incurred in order to qualify under these
exceptions.27 Accordingly, the date of transfer was an important compo-
nent of section 547(c). The legislative history and official comment by
Senator DeConcini on this section clearly delineates the determinative
date of a transfer by check for these two exceptions:
[P]ayment of a debt by means of a check is equivalent to a cash pay-
ment, unless the check is dishonored. Payment is considered to be
made when the check is delivered for purposes of sections 547(c)(1)
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was
made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or
financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms;
(3) that creates a seeurity interest in property acquired by the debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest seeures new value that was-
(i) given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of
such property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and
(B) that is perfeeted on or before 10 days after the debtor receives possession of such
property;
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor
gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable seeurity interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoida-
ble transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor;
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of
either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a
reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors
holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such security inter-
est exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of-
(A)(i) with respeet to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies,
90 days before the date of the fling of the petition; or
(ii) with respeet to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section applies,
one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security agreement creat-
ing such security interest;
(6) that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 of this title;
or
(7) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts,
the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less
than $600.
11 U.S.C § 547(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
27. Section 547(c)(2) was amended in 1984 to remove the 45-day requirement partly because 45
days proved to be too short a time period to accomplish the specific goal of the exception, which was
to insulate short-term credit transactions between debtors and creditors. DeSimone, supra note 11,
at 110-11. Professor DeSimone argues that the amendment did not solve the problems surrounding
section 547(c)(2) but merely "substituted one set of problems for another." Id at 133. None of the
problems involved with this section relate to the timing problem addressed here.
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and (2).28
If this legislative comment applied to section 547(b), that would be the
end of the matter. Courts, however, are divided on its applicability to the
90-day requirement of section 547(b). In order to ascertain whether de-
livery or honor should determine the date of transfer, both the purposes
of the Code as well as the practices of the commercial world should first
be considered.
III. THE PURPOSES OF THE CODE AND COMMERCIAL LAW
A. Purposes of the Code.
The preference section of the Code has three objectives. First, the
section attempts to lessen the possibility of a "scramble among creditors"
for an advantage; second, the section mandates a pro rata distribution
among creditors; and third, the section eliminates the incentive to make
unwise loans to a troubled creditor in order to obtain a preferential pay-
ment or security.29
B. Commercial Law.
The UCC provides that a check does not itself operate as an assign-
ment of funds.30 Furthermore, the UCC states that the obligation for
which the check is given is not discharged until it is presented and ac-
cepted by the bank.31 Thus, under accepted commercial practice, a
transfer by check is not completed until the check is honored by the
bank. In itself, this suggests that for the purpose of section 547(b) the
date of honor should be used. Any deviation from the accepted practice
in commercial law as codified by the UCC should be explicitly expressed
by Congress or supported by compelling policy.32
28. 124 CONG. REc. 34,000 (1978); see 124 CONG. REc. 32,400 (1978) (statement of Rep. Ed-
wards), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 6457 ("Payment is considered to be
made when the check is delivered for purposes of sections 547(c)(1) and (2)."). These statements are
included in the Legislative Statements to 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
29. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 137,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 202 (1976). For a discussion of the "race of diligence" among credi-
tors, see DeSimone, supra note 11, at 98-99.
Professor Ross argues that, in addition, the preference section, by enhancing bankruptcy distri-
butions to creditors as a whole, mitigates the financial loss to creditors thereby reducing the social
costs of bankruptcy. Ross, supra note 16, at 45.
30. U.C.C. § 3-409(1) (1977) ("A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assign-
ment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable
on the instrument until he accepts it.").
31. U.C.C. § 3-802 (1977).
32. See Remes v. Acme Carton Corp. (In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co.), 43 Bankr. 871, 876
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984) (Where congressional intent is not clearly indicated "a court should be
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Those in favor of using the date of delivery as the date of transfer
sometimes argue that commercial law supports using the delivery date
because "in the commercial world receipt of a check, as distinguished
from the date it clears the drawee bank, is customarily looked upon as
the date of payment of an obligation."'33 In reality, this argument pro-
vides only illusory support for using the delivery date as the date of
transfer. The UCC explicitly states that the obligation for which a check
is given is not discharged until it is presented and accepted by the bank.34
Whether or not receipt of a check is customarily looked upon as the date
of payment, custom has been replaced by statute. Indeed, commercial
law and pragmatic concerns of protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy
process support the argument that the date of honor should constitute a
transfer under section 547(b). Before turning to the policy considera-
tions of the delivery/honor issue, it is helpful to first evaluate the various
judicial approaches to resolving this issue.
IV. JUDICIAL APPROACHES
All of the cases raising the question of when a transfer by check
occurs for purposes of avoiding preferences involve comparable factual
situations. The series of events leading to litigation on this issue can be
illustrated by the facts of Eisenberg v. JL International, Ltd. (In re Sider
Ventures & Services Corp.).35 In Sider, the debtor delivered a check to a
creditor on December 14. The check was honored by the bank on De-
cember 18. The debtor subsequently filed for bankruptcy on March 15.
The 90-day period of section 547(b) began on December 15, between the
date of delivery and the date on which the check was honored.3 6 Ac-
cordingly, the trustee sued for return of the check as a preferential trans-
fer. The creditor, however, claimed that the transfer occurred on the
date of delivery and because this date fell outside the 90-day period, the
transfer was not preferential. Under both the Act and the Code, courts
have disagreed as to the determinative date of a transfer by check in such
a situation.
guided by policy considerations underlying the paragraph in question."), aft'd, 71 Bankr. 287 (W.D.
Mich. 1987).
33. Bernstein v. RJL Leasing (In re White River Corp.), 799 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1986)
(citing Young Supply Co. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 55 Bankr. 356, 357 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985)).
34. U.C.C. § 3-802 (1977).
35. 33 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) aff'd, 47 Bankr. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
36. Id. at 709.
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A. Decisions Under the Bankruptcy Act.
Three circuit courts of appeals addressed the issue of when a trans-
fer by check occurred for purposes of the four-month voidability period
of section 60 of the Act-the precursor of the present 90-day require-
ment. In Nicholson v. First Investment Co., 37 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that "the date of transfer is the
date when the check is honored by the paying bank. 38 The court rea-
soned that a transfer must diminish the bankruptcy estate in order to be a
preference.3 9 Because an estate is not effectively diminished until a check
is honored out of the estate's funds, the transfer could not occur at the
time of delivery.4° Also, until the check is honored, another creditor
could effectively collect the funds represented by the check through such
means as garnishment proceedings. 41 It is not until the check is honored
and the creditor actually receives the funds that the estate is depleted and
a transfer has occurred. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, in an earlier decision, came to the same conclusion.42
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held, in Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft, Inc.,43 that checks delivered
to creditors outside the four-month voidability period were not voidable
as preferential transfers despite the fact that they were honored by the
bank within four months of the date of filing.44 The court held that pay-
ment by check was equivalent to payment by cash "so long as the check
was presented within a reasonable time and not dishonored." 45
B. Decisions Under the Bankruptcy Code.
Rather than clarifying the issue, the Code and its accompanying leg-
islative history have only exacerbated the problem of determining the
transfer date of a check under the Code's 90-day limitation. The added
confusion is due to the potential relevance of other sections of the Code
to the timing question of transfers by check under section 547(b). For
instance, does Senator DeConcini's comment to section 547(c) that a
37. 705 F.2d 410 (1lth Cir. 1983).
38. Id. at 413.
39. Id. (citing In re Souder, 449 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971)); see also COLLIER, supra note 8,
547.03[2], at 547-22 to 547-25 (transfer must deplete debtor's estate in order to be a preference).
40. 705 F.2d at 413.
41. Id.
42. Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance Corp., 491 F.2d 1288, 1293 (7th Cir. 1974).
43. 680 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982).
44. Id. at 646.
45. Id. The court also referred to the legislative history of section 547(c) of the Code even
though the case arose under the Act. Id. For a discussion of section 547(c) and cases interpreting it,
see infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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check is to be treated as a transfer at the time of delivery apply, either
directly or by implication, to section 547(b)?46 Further, does section
547(e),47 which relates to the perfection of transfers of real property or
securities, apply to section 547(b)-and if so, with what result? In an-
swering these questions, courts not only disagree as to whether the date
of delivery or the date of honor constitutes a transfer by check, they also
apply varying rationales when reaching either conclusion.
When deciding the determinative date of a transfer by check, courts
rely on one of four primary theories.48 The first theory posits that Sena-
tor DeConcini's comment to treat the delivery of a check as a transfer
under the Code's exception section-547(c)--applies to section 547(b):
thus, delivery constitutes a transfer of a check for purposes of section
547(b).49 The second theory applies the rule in section 547(e)(2)(A) that
delivery is the equivalent of a transfer between the parties: thus, delivery
of the check constitutes transfer. 50 The third theory posits that section
547(e)(1)(B) applies to section 547(b) such that a transfer by check oc-
curs when another creditor can no longer secure a judicial lien on the
transferred property: thus, honor constitutes a transfer.51 The last the-
46. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
47. Section 547(e) provides:
(1) For the purposes of this section-
(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the interest of a
seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property, is perfected when a
bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom applicable law
permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the
interest of the transferec; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the
interest of the transferee.
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsec-
tion, a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if
such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time;(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 10
days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such transfer is not
perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired
rights in thc property transferred.
II U.SC. § 547(e) (1982 & Supp. l 1985).
48. Two or more compatible theories have also been applied in the same case.
49. E.g., Robert K. Morrow, Inc. v. Agri-Beef Co. (In re Kenitra, Inc.), 797 F.2d 790, 791 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 928 (1987); Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft, Inc., 680 F.2d 645,
646 (9th Cir. 1982); Franzwa v. Pro Sales, Inc. (In re Walker Indus. Auctioneers, Inc.), 45 Bankr.
452, 453-54 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984).
50. Eg., Eisenberg v. J L Int'l, Ltd. (In re Sider Ventures & Servs. Corp.), 33 Bankr. 708
(Bankr. SD.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 47 Bankr. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
51. Bob Grissett GolfShoppes, Inc. v. Pro Group, Inc. (In re Bob Grissett Golf Shoppes, Inc.),
34 Bankr. 320, 322 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983); see, eg., Artesani v. Travco Plastics Co. (In re Super
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ory, followed by the majority of courts, compares the different policy
concerns underlying section 547(c) and 547(b) and finds that each justi-
fies different transfer dates. While the policy behind section 547(c)'s ex-
ceptions does require that the date of delivery controls the date of
transfer, the policy behind section 547(b)'s 90-day preference period re-
quires that the date of honor determines the date of transfer.52
1. The First Theory: Application of the Legislative Comment to
Section 547(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit is the major judicial proponent of the theory that the date of delivery
is the determinative date of a transfer by check under section 547(b).
Although addressing the question under the Act and not under the Code,
the Ninth Circuit, in Shamrock Golf Co. v. Richcraft, Inc., 53 used Sena-
tor DeConcini's comment accompanying section 547(c)(1) and (2) to
support its conclusion. Section 547(c) contains exceptions which allow a
creditor to keep contemporaneous transfers-that is, to keep those trans-
fers where new value is exchanged for an equivalent value in a single
transaction.5 4 The court reasoned that payment by check was the
equivalent of a cash sale and thus a contemporaneous transfer. 55 Ac-
cordingly, because the date of the delivery of a check constitutes the date
of transfer for contemporaneous transfers, the date of delivery was also
the date of transfer for the statutory time period in section 547(b). 56 This
position was directly affirmed in Morrow v. Agri-Beef Co. (In re Keni-
tra),57 a recent Ninth Circuit case arising under the Code.
Market Distribs. Corp.), 25 Bankr. 63, 64-65 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); Ardmore Sales Co. v. Thico
Plan, Inc. (In re Ardmore Sales Co.), 22 Bankr. 911, 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Carmack v. Zell
(In re Mindy's, Inc.), 17 Bankr. 177, 178-79 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Itule v. Luhr Jensen & Sons
(In re Sportsco, Inc.), 12 Bankr. 34, 36 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1981).
52. E.g., Remes v. Acme Carton Corp. (In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co.), 43 Bankr. 871, 873-76
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 71 Bankr. 287 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Video East, Inc. v. Acadia
Video Co. (In re Video East, Inc.), 33 Bankr. 61, 63 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); Brent Explorations, Inc.
v. Karst Enters. (In re Brent Explorations, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 745, 751-52 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983);
Harris v. Harbin Lumber Co. (In re Ellison), 31 Bankr. 545, 547 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983); Quinn v.
TI Distrib. Corp. (In re Moran Air Cargo, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 406, 408 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); Gander
Mountain, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods Co. (In re Gander Mountain, Inc.), 29 Bankr. 269, 270 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 1983); Campbell v. Kimberly Clark Corp. (In re Skinner Lumber Co.), 27 Bankr. 669, 671
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); Rovzar v. Biddeford & Saco Bus Garage, Inc. (In re Saco Local Dev. Corp.),
25 Bankr. 876, 879 n.5 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); In re Duffy, 3 Bankr. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980).
53. 680 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1982).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1) (1982). A contemporaneous transfer is essentially a "wash transac-
tion"-one in which an amount of property is transferred in return for equivalent new property.
Such a transaction does not deplete the debtor's estate since what transfers out is replaced. Thus the
remaining creditors are not prejudiced by such a payment.
55. 680 F.2d at 646.
56. Id.
57. 797 F.2d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 928 (1987).
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2. The Second and Third Theories: Application of Section 547(e).
Federal courts have applied various subsections of section 547(e) that
deal with the issue of when a transfer is "perfected" to transfers by check
for the purpose of determining the date of transfer for section 547(b).5 8
These applications are neither uniform nor consistent. Indeed, different
courts have reached opposite holdings by using different subsections of
section 547(e) in their analysis.
Although section 547(e) generally pertains to the perfection of inter-
est in real property or securities,5 9 some courts have applied this section
to checks as well. In Eisenberg v. J L International, Ltd. (In re Sider
Ventures & Services Corp.,)6° the court applied section 547(e)(2)(A) to a
situation involving section 547(b). Section 547(e)(2)(A) provides that the
time of transfer is when it "takes effect between the transferor and the
transferee if [it] is perfected at, or within ten days after [this] time. '61
Using this section's language, the court in Sider held that the date of the
delivery of a check was controlling as the date of transfer under 547(b)
because it is at this point that it "takes effect" between the debtor and the
creditor.62
A contrary result was reached in Artesani v. Travco Plastics Co. (In
re Super Market Distributors).63 Instead of applying section 547(e)(2)(A)
to the question, the court applied section 547(e)(1)(B), which provides
that a transfer is perfected "when a creditor on a simple contract cannot
acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee."'
In accordance with this subsection, the court held that the date of the
transfer by check was the date it was honored by the bank because after
that time a judicial lien could no longer be attached to the funds. 65 ,
Several courts have refused to apply section 547(e). 66 These courts
58. See supra note 48.
59. See supra note 47.
60. 33 Bankr. 708 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 47 Bankr. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1982).
62. 33 Bankr. at 711. The court noted that the check had, in fact, been honored by the payee
bank within 10 days after delivery, implying that actual perfection occured when it was honored.
63. 25 Bankr. 63 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1982).
65. 25 Bankr. at 64-65.
66. E.g., Ray v. Security Mut. Fin. Corp. (In re Arnett), 731 F.2d 358, 362 (6th Cir. 1984)
("Congress has given security interests specialized treatment both in sections 547(c)(3) and
547(e)(2) .... Congress [intended] to differentiate [between the transfer of checks and security
interests] under the Bankruptcy Reform Act."); O'Neill v. Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d 35, 38
(1st Cir, 1984) (Section 547(e) "deals with the perfection of security interests in the debtor's prop-
erty."); Chaitman v. Chicago Boiler Co. (In re Almarc Mfg., Inc.), 52 Bankr. 582, 584 (Bankr. N.D.
I1. 1985) ("The legislative history of [section 547(e)] ... restricts [its] application to matters involv-
ing secured transactions."); Remes v. Acme Carton Corp. (In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co.), 43 Bankr.
871, 875 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984) (Section 547(e) was not intended "to apply beyond the realm of
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reason that Congress intended section 547(e) to apply only to secured
transactions. Because a check does not create a security interest in the
funds involved, application of this section to checks is misplaced.
The court in Remes v. Acme Carton Corp. (In re Fasano/Harriss Pie
Co.)67 advanced this argument, following both the First68 and Sixth 69
Circuits in rejecting the application of section 547(e) to the controversy.
The court concluded that Congress intended section 547(e) to apply only
to secured transactions. 70 This conclusion is based on the legislative his-
tory of section 547(e), which states that the section "is designed to reach
the different results under the 1962 version of Article 9 of the U.C.C.
[dealing with secured transactions] and under the 1972 version .... -71
Because checks are not security instruments under Article 9 of the UCC,
and section 547(e) deals only with secured instruments, this section does
not apply to checks in determining when they constitute a transfer under
the other subsections of section 547. 72
3. The Fourth Theory: Policy Considerations Mandate the Date of
Honor as the Date of Transfer. The majority of bankruptcy courts-
outside of the Ninth Circuit-that have decided the issue under section
547(b) have held that the date the bank honors the check is the date that
determines whether the transfer is preferential.73 These courts reject the-
ories that look to outside sources such as the legislative comment to sec-
tion 547(c) or the language of section 547(e); rather these courts analyze
the underlying policy bases for the different subsections of section 547, as
well as the traditional commercial practice of negotiable instruments.
In Remes v. Acme Carton Corp. (In re Fasano/Harriss Pie Co. ),74 for
example, one of several checks issued by the now-bankrupt debtor was
delivered before the 90-day preference period but honored within the 90
days. The court held that the date of honor determined the date of trans-
secured transactions."), aff'd, 71 Bankr. 287 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Franzwa v. Pro Sales, Inc., (In re
Walker Indus. Auctioneers, Inc.), 45 Bankr. 452, 454 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984) (Section 547(e) "does not
govern transactions that are not ... transfer[s] of a security interest in property.").
67. 43 Bankr. 871 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 71 Bankr. 287 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
68. O'Neill v Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d at 38.
69. In re Arnett, 731 F.2d at 364.
70. 43 Bankr. at 875. See also cases cited supra note 66.
71. 43 Bankr. at 875 (quoting S. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1978)).
72. Id. See O'Neill v. Nestle Libbys P.R., Inc., 729 F.2d 35, 38 (lst Cir. 1984); Chaitman v.
Chicago Boiler Co. (In re Almarc Mfg., Inc.), 52 Bankr. 582, 584 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985); Franzwa
v. Pro Sales, Inc. (In re Walker Indus. Auctioneers, Inc.), 45 Bankr. 452, 454 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984).
73. A number of courts have merely followed the lead of other bankruptcy courts without
performing their own analysis. E.g., In re Moran Air Cargo, Inc., 30 Bankr. 406 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1983); In re Skinner Lumber Co., 27 Bankr. 669 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); In re Fabric Buys of Jericho,
Inc., 22 Bankr. 1010 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
74. 43 Bankr. 871 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 71 Bankr. 287 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
fer and allowed the check to be avoided and returned to the estate. 75 The
court based its holding on an analysis of congressional purpose 76 and
distinguished the use of the date of delivery for section 547(c) by the
different policy considerations of that section.77
C. Policy Concerns.
The policies underlying sections 547(b) and 547(c) do justify differ-
ent determinations as to the date of transfer. Subsections 547(c)(1) and
(2) benefit the debtor; they are "designed to encourage creditors to deal
with a failing business and to protect ordinary business transactions" in
order to prevent the debtor's slide into bankruptcy.78 Treating the check
as cash and accordingly the delivery date as the date of transfer, as re-
quired by Senator DeConcini's comment, best implements this policy. 79
The exceptions of 547(c) allow a creditor to keep transfers that occur in a
contemporaneous transfer or a transfer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. Because such transactions involve a simultaneous exchange of
equivalent value, it follows that the payment should be treated as a cash
transaction whether the payment is made by cash or by check. Thus,
under section 547(c), "Congress intended to create an exception to the
general rule that a check is not a transfer until it is honored by the
drawee bank."80
Section 547(b) is far more concerned with the welfare of creditors. It
addresses the depletion of the debtor's estate 81 in order to avoid transac-
tions to favored creditors. 82 To be avoidable, a preferential transfer must
occur in a credit transaction; transfers must be in payment of an already
existing debt and such transfer must deplete the bankruptcy estate.83 No
policy is promoted by treating a transfer as cash for purposes of avoiding
transfers to favored creditors. Unlike section 547(c), no justification ex-
ists for deviating from accepted commercial practice or for deviating
75. Id. at 874.
76. The court also noted that a majority of courts used the date of honor. Id at 873-74.
77. Id. at 876 n.2.
78. Id. at 876; see also Tidwell v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (In re Georgia Steel, Inc.), 38 Bankr.
829, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984) ("Such a delay is clearly not in the interest of a distressed business
79. Bernstein v. RJL Leasing (In re White River Corp.), 799 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1986)
("The delivery date view encourages trade creditors to continue dealing with troubled businesses by
insulating normal business transactions from the trustee's avoiding power."); Fasano/Harriss, 43
Bankr. at 876 (date of delivery best implements the policy of sections 547(c)(1), (2) and (4)).
80. Georgia Steel, 38 Bankr. at 834 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Fasano/Harriss, 43 Bankr. at 876 n.2.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
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from the general rule that a check is not a transfer until it is honored.84
Nor has Congress explicitly expressed any intention of creating an excep-
tion or deviation for section 547(b). Thus, the date of honoring a check
should remain the date that the transfer took place.85
The Fasano/Harriss court also relied on basic commercial law prin-
ciples to support its reasoning. The court noted that "a check simply
presents an order to the drawee bank to make payment and does not vest
in the payee any title to or interest in the funds of the drawee bank until
the check is honored."' 86 Therefore, because a creditor does not receive
an interest in funds until a check is honored, a transfer does not occur
until that time.87
V. PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR USING
THE DATE OF ACCEPTANCE
Pragmatic concerns also justify ushig the date of honor over the date
of delivery for purposes of section 547(b). The strongest argument
against using the date of honor is that the date of delivery would provide
an element of certainty for creditors receiving payment by check. This
argument, however, is not compelling.
First, as recently noted by the Ninth Circuit, an opportunity for
manipulation arises if the delivery of a check is considered the transfer of
funds. 88 Under such circumstances, the debtor, as opposed to the bank,
determines the precise date of transfer. It is also the debtor who chooses
the date of filing; by determining both, a debtor effectively can "prefer"
one creditor over another. Therefore, though creating "certainty" for an
individual creditor, using the date of delivery permits manipulation and
creates uncertainty for all others involved in the bankruptcy process.
In addition, several practical arguments mitigate against the con-
cern for providing creditors with certainty. First, a transferee receives
the funds represented by a check on the day the check is honored. Using
this date to determine the date of transfer follows logically. Until the
bank honors a check, a creditor has no control over the funds repre-
sented by the check and in fact, has no guarantee of receiving payment.
For instance, other creditors may prevent collection on a check through
garnishment of the bank account, the debtor may stop payment on a
check, or there may be insufficient funds to cover the payment of a
84. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
85. Fasano/Harriss, 43 Bankr. at 873-74; Georgia Steel, 38 Bankr. at 834.
86. 43 Bankr. at 873-74.
87. Id. See also notes 30-32 and accompanying text
88. Kupetz v. Elaine Monroe Assoc. (In re Wolf & Vine), 825 F.2d 197, 202 (9th Cir. 1987).
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check.89 Because the creditor remains vulnerable to these actions until
the check is honored by the bank, a creditor has not truly received a
transfer of the funds when the check is delivered and should not be
treated as having received them under section 547(b).
Similarly, as noted in In re Georgia Steel, Inc., 90 the date of honor -
should determine the date of transfer because that is when the debtor's
estate is depleted. The funds represented by a check remain part of the
debtor's property until the check is honored by the bank which debits the
debtor's account. Until the check is honored and the debtor's account is
debited, no actual transfer of funds has occurred. Instead, only an ex-
change of a negotiable instrument-the check-has occurred between
the parties. 91
If a particular creditor desires to protect himself from having his
payment recalled, the creditor may require payment by cashier's check
or certified check. These instruments are obligations of the bank and
effectively diminish the estate of the debtor when certified. 92 Because the
check is immediately honored and has already diminished the debtor's
estate, the date of delivery would be the effective equivalent of the date of
transfer.
VI. CONCLUSION
The preference section of the Code has spawned disagreement over
when a transfer by check occurs for its various provisions. Courts exam-
ining this issue have come to a variety of conclusions and use differing
rationales even when arriving at the same conclusion. Neither the spe-
cific wording of the section nor its legislative history presents an obvious
solution to the question. Nonetheless, the policy considerations underly-
ing the section, as well as basic commercial law and pragmatic concerns,
have led a majority of bankruptcy courts to hold that the date of honor is
the date of transfer for purposes of section 547(b). The reasoning of
these courts is compelling. In the future, courts should analyze this issue
by weighing the relevant policy considerations. They should reject the
Ninth Circuit's application of the legislative comment to section 547(c)
and rule that the determinative date of a transfer for section 547(b) is the
date on which the check is honored by the bank.
Lisa R. Reid
89. 43 Bankr. at 874.
90. 38 Bankr. at 829, 833-34 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984).
91. Id. at 833.
92. Meister v. State National Bank of Connecticut (In re Mailbag Int'l, Inc.,), 28 Bankr. 905
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (certified check transfered at time of delivery).
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